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Kepler: The Meaning of Minerals in the Stock-Raising Homestead Act Minera

COMMENTS
THE MEANING OF MINERALS IN THE
STOCK-RAISING HOMESTEAD ACT
MINERAL RESERVATION
The word "minerals" has been the subject of a confusing
array of cases and law review articles. The result is that
the meaning of "minerals" depends on how and where it is
used, what the parties meant it to mean and what a particular
court or agency says it means.' In the last four years, courts
have had occasion to determine the meaning of "minerals"
within the mineral reservation in patents issued under the
Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916.2 In January of 1977,
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calfornia held that geothermal steam was a mineral reserved to
the United States.' And in August of 1979, the United States
District Court of Wyoming held that gravel was also a
mineral within the SRHA mineral reservation.4 The purpose
of this comment is to discuss and evaluate the methods of
determining the meaning of "minerals" within the mineral
reservation of the SRHA.
FEDERAL VERSUS PRIVATE GRANTS

Before examining the meaning of "minerals" in the
SRHA reservation, it is important to point out the differences
in determining the meaning of the term in private deeds
and the meaning of the term in statutes and the grants or
Copyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming

1. "'Mineral' is a word of general language, and not per se a term of art. It
does not have a definite meaning. It is used in many senses. It is not
capable of a definition of universal application, but is susceptible to limitation or expansion according to the intention with which it was used in the
particular instrument or statute. Regard must be had to the language of
the instrument in which it occurs, the relative position of the parties
interested and the substance of the transaction which the instrument embodies. The word, if broadly construed would include gravel." Bumpus v.
U.S., 325 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1963). See generally Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Minerals",54 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 423 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Reeves.], Patterson, Ownership of "Other Minerals", 25 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 21.1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Patterson.]
2. 43 U.S.C. § 291 et seq. (repealed 1976).
3. United States v. Union Oil Co. of California, 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. den. 434 U.S. 930 (1977) [hereinafter cited in text as Union Oil.]
4. Western Nuclear. Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654 (D. Wyo. 1979) [hereinafter cited in text as Western Nuclear.]
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patents issued under those statutes. In construing private
deeds, the intention of the parties to the instrument controls.5
These grants are often construed most strongly against the
grantor.' Each state may have its own particular rules of
construction, and in interpreting a particular instrument a
party must turn to the law of the state which governs that
instrument.'
In interpreting statutes, general rules of statutory construction are followed. The language and purpose of the
statute and the intent of the legislature are primary considerations.' Federal grants are construed favorably to the
government, and "nothing passes except what is conveyed
in clear language." 9 There are a number of sources available
to determine congressional intent which are not available in
the area of private deeds. These are: stated legislative purpose, legislative history, related sections of the same statute,
other statutes on the same matter and federal agency
decisions.
Because "minerals" is not a term of art, authority which
defines the term one way is not always applicable to determination of the meaning of the term in a different context.
This has led to conflicting results in cases concerning private
deeds'0 and is a stumbling block to courts in interpreting
federal statutes. This inquiry, then, into th6 meaning of
"minerals" shall be in the context of the SRHA. Authority
concerning private deeds will be referred to only as it may
add to the analysis of this particular act.
THE STOCK-RAISING HOMESTEAD ACT

The SRHA was enacted on December 29, 1916." It
provided for entry under homestead laws of not more than
640 acres of unappropriated, unreserved public stock-raising
5. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L. J. 107
6.
7.
8.
9.
.1Q.
11.

(1949) [hereinafter cited as Kuntz.]
Reeves, supra note 1, at 441.
Patterson, supra note 1, at 21-57.
Reeves, supra note 1, at 440 and 441.
United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957).
Kuntz, supra note 5, at 112.
Pub. L. No. 290, 39 Stat. 862 (1916).
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lands. 2 Stock-raising land was defined as land, the surface
of which was chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage
crops, which did not contain merchantable timber, was not
susceptible of irrigation from any known source of water
supply, and was of such a character that 640 acres was
reasonably required to support a family. 3
Entries made and patents issued under this act were
subject to a reservation to the United States of "all the coal
and other minerals in the lands so entered and patented,
together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove
the same."14 The minerals were then subject to disposal by
the United States in accordance with the coal and mineral
land laws in force at the time of disposal. The Act allowed
persons acquiring the minerals from the United States to
mine and remove minerals upon securing written consent
or waiver of the homesteader, upon payment of damages to
crops and tangible improvements, or upon executing a bond
sufficient to secure the payment of such damages." Later,
Congress extended the amount of damages recoverable when
minerals were removed by strip or open pit mining to
damage caused to the value of the land for grazing."
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN GENERAL

When statutory language is not clear, courts may turn
to other sources to determine the meaning of the statute.
The statute should receive the construction which will carry
out the intent of Congress.' It is a well settled rule that
legislative history composed of congressional debates, amendments;- committee reports, etc., attending the enactment of
the statute, may be resorted to as an aid in determining
the construction of a statute. 8 A court may also turn to the
12. 43 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
13.

43 U.S.C. § 292 (1976).

14. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976).
15. Id.
16. 30 U.S.C. § 54 (1976)

§ 5, 63 Stat. 215).

(originally enacted as Act of June 21, 1949, ch. 232,

17. Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 (1885). For
analysis of the inherent pitfalls in searching for intent see: Dickerson,
Statutory Interpretation:A Peek into the Mind and Will of a Legislature,
50 IND. L. J. 206 (1975).
18. Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 5, 7 (1931).
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history and conditions of the times when the act was passed."9
It must construe the statute in light of the impressions under
which Congress did in fact act, and whether Congress was
mistaken in its view is not for a court to consider when it is
interpreting a statute.2 0
Legislatures are presumed to have used statutory terms
in their judicially established meaning.2 Thus, a court may
refer to judicial interpretations of a word in cases which
were decided before an act was passed. Deference is also
given the contemporaneous interpretations of a statute by
the officer or agency charged with its administration. 2 The
weight accorded administrative interpretations is not dependent on strict contemporaneity,23 yet a lack of contemporaneity may still limit the influence of such interpretations."
HISTORY

In both Union Oil and Western Nuclear, the courts
looked to historical events preceding the enactment of the
SRHA."5 Before 1909, public lands were disposed of as either
wholly mineral or wholly non-mineral. But because of inadequate methods of classification, the system was abused
and much valuable mineral land passed to individuals for
minimum amounts in return. It was President Theodore
Roosevelt who acted to prevent this abuse. He withdrew
large areas of land thought to be valuable for coal from
entry. He pointed out to Congress "the importance of conserving the supplies of mineral fuels still belonging to the
government."2 The Secretary of Interior recommended
separating the right to mine from title to the soil.2 7 Congress
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 273 (1942).
Moor v. Country of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 709 (1973).
Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 242 (1909).
Udall v. Tallman. 380 U.S. 1 (1965) reh. den. 380 U.S. 989 (1965).
Great Northern R. Co. v. U.S., supra note 19, at 275 (agency interpretations
made thirteen years after enactment accepted).
United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., supra note 3, at 1279. The court
refused to give weight to Department of Interior communications which
stated that geothermal resources were not minerals within the meaning of
the SRHA mineral reservation. The court noted that these letters were
written a half century after the act was passed, were inconsistent with one
another and were "weakly reasoned." Id. at 1280 (footnote 19).
United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., supra note 3 at 1274-1276; Western
Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, supra note 4 at 657.
Id. 41 CONG. REc. 2806 (1907).
Id.
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apparently heeded these suggestions and passed the Coal
Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910, which allowed agricultural
entries but reserved the coal to the United States. 8 In 1914,
the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 was passed, which
allowed agricultural entry on lands withdrawn as valuable
for phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas or asphaltic minerals
and provided for patents reserving the particular mineral
for which the land had been withdrawn.2 9
In Union Oil, this history was used to support the
court's determination that it was the purpose of Congress
in enacting the SRHA to retain subsurface fuel resources
in public ownership for conservation and subsequent orderly
disposition in the public interest.3 0 This purpose is too
narrow in and of itself, of course, for it would not include
the reservation of minerals such as gold and silver which
are not fuel resources.
STARE DECISIS

Stare decisis is not much help in determining whether
geothermal steam is a mineral because courts have not had
much occasion to examine its nature. The history of gravel,
however, is filled with judicial interpretations. In Western
Nuclear, the court did a rather comprehensive examination
of cases which had determined whether gravel or similar
types of material was a mineral. The court looked at Land
Department decisions, state court decisions construing private mineral reservations, state court decisions construing
federal mineral reservations, federal district court decisions,
federal circuit court decisions and one United States Supreme
Court decision. But the court failed to point out the weight
these decisions should have had in interpreting the SRHA.
First, as mentioned above, "mineral" is not a term of
art. One court's definition of the term in 1979 is not necessarily the same as Congress' definition of the term in 1916.
28.

30 U.S.C. § 81 (1976)

(originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1909) ch.

270, 35 Stat. 844; 30 U.S.C. §§ 83 et seq. (1976) (originally enacted as
Act of June 22, 1910, ch. 318 § 1, 36 Stat. 583).
29. 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-123 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of July 17, 1914,
ch. 142, § 1, 38 Stat. 509).
$0. United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif. supra note 3, at 1274-1276.
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All authority must be examined in regard to its applicability
to interpretation of the SRHA. Private mineral reservations
are not applicable." Under federal law, the determination of
whether gravel is a mineral may come in the context of the
Mineral Location Law of 1872,32 or of a federal;grant of
land which was not, under the particular statute, to be
"mineral land." It also occurs in the context of condemnation
in which the minerals are reserved to the individual whose
land was condemned.
Case authority dealing with the SRHA is, of course, the
most important. In Skeen v. Lynch,3" the plaintiff had
entered and received a patent on 640 acres of land under
the SRHA. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant
who had received a permit to prospect and drill for oil and
gas on the same 640 acres. The first count alleged that,
assuming the United States had reserved the water, oil and
gas, the plaintiff owned a preferential right to prospect and
produce oil and gas from the land. The court affirmed the
grant of the motion to dismiss the first count because the
United States was an indispensable party and had not been
joined. In deciding the second count, the court accepted the
assumption that oil and gas were reserved to the United
States as irrefutable and held that the plaintiff had no
preferential right to prospect and drill for oil and gas.
Although the court's comments on the SRHA reservation should be just dicta because the United States was an
indispensable party, this part of the decision has been
cited in later cases.3 4 The court said that the legislative
history left "no room to doubt that it was the purpose of
Congress in the use of the phrase 'all coal and other minerals'
to segregate the two estates, the surface for stock raising
and agricultural purposes from the mineral estate... ." The
31. See text supra at note 5. Note that the court in Western Nuclear stated
that generally these private mineral reservations do not include gravel.
Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, supra note 4, at 661.
32. 30 U.S.C. § 21 et seq. (1976).
33. Skeen v. Lynch, 48 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir. 1931) [hereinafter cited in text as
Skeen.]
34. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d
122 (1971); United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., supra note 3, at 1276;
Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, supra note 4 at 662.

35. Skeen v. Lynch, supra note 33, at 1046.,.
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court refused to apply the rule of ejusdem generis because
the sentence after the reservation language in the statute
said that the coal and other minerals would be subject to
disposal in accord with the coal and mineral land laws in
force and such language did not comport with a reading
that the reservation included only coal.86
There is no doubt that legislative history supported the
conclusion in Skeen. In the House of Representatives floor
debate on the conference bill, when asked whether the reservation included oil, Congressman Ferris replied that it would.
When it was pointed out that oil was not a mineral, Congressman Ferris said that if there was any doubt about it
they would include oil in the reservation."
Another case dealing with the mineral reservation in
the SRHA was State ex rel. State Highway Commission v.
Trujillo." Trujillo's land was condemned by the State of
New Mexico. The State district court determined that the
State need not compensate Trujillo for the road building
material taken from the land because it was reserved to the
United States under the SRHA patent granted to Trujillo's
predecessor in interest. The New Mexico Supreme Court
reversed and directed the trial court to enter judgment for
Trujillo. 9 The court refused to follow the Skeen theory that
it was the intention of Congress to create two estates."
Apparently the court was confused by the district court's
misinterpretation of Skeen that the land was divided into
surface and subsurface estates." It instead looked at an
A.L.R.2d Annotation dealing with the term "minerals" with
regard to sand, clay and gravel in deeds, leases and licenses
between private parties. 2 The court found that because the
36. Id. at 1046-1047.
37.

53 CONG. REC. 1171 (1916).

38. State ex rel State Highway Commission v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d
122 (1971).
39. Id. at 126.
40.
41.

id. at 125.
Skeen did not suggest the segregation of the land into a surface estate and
a subsurface estate but rather the segregation of land into a surface estate
and a mineral estate. The term, surface, has a well recognized meaning
which encompasses not only the superficies but also the land in the mineral
grant or reservation. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.49, 580.2 (1980).
42. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Trujillo, supra note 34, at 124.
See also: Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 843 (1964).
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road building material had no exceptional characteristics
which distinguished it from the surrounding soil, and because
it formed a part of the surface and could not be obtained
without destruction of the surface, the material was not a
mineral.
The primary problem with this analysis is that it relies
on authority which examined the intent of the parties to
private deeds. This is of limited value in determining the
intent or purpose of Congress. The next problem is with
placing emphasis on the destruction of the surface. Private
deeds and leases often do not expressly provide for damages
to the surface upon removal of the minerals. The SRHA and
the later amendment" do provide for payment of damages
which might remove the SRHA reservation from the court's
line of reasoning.
The court in Western Nuclear also had the opportunity
on Union Oil. In Union Oil, the court properly inrely
to
quired into the purpose of Congress in passing the SRHA
and found the purpose to be to retain subsurface resources,
particularly sources of energy, for separate disposition and
development in the public interest. This purpose was not of
much help to the court in Western Nuclear since gravel has
not yet been found to be an energy resource.
The Western Nuclear court's reliance on cases defining
minerals in contexts other than the SRHA and at a time
later than 1916 is misplaced. First, the congressional intent
and purpose of other statutes is not the same as it was for
the SRHA. And second, in determining the meaning of a
term in a statute, courts presume the term was used in its
judicially settled or well known meaning. The legislature
could not have been aware of a judicially settled meaning
which was settled after the act was passed.
One result of this misplaced reliance is the court's
definition of a mineral as a substance which is found to be
valuable at any point in time." Value is an important factor
43. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976). See text supra at note 15.

44. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, aupra note 4, at 662.
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of time examining the use of the word in unrelated areas of
law. Its conclusion that the mineral estate is a flexible
entity which expands with the development of the arts and
sciences is not well founded. The court should have spent
more time examining the intent and purpose of Congress
in enacting the SRHA and examined more closely the cases
which already dealt with the SRHA.
RELATED ACTS

Having eliminated the consideration of a number of
extraneous cases, the next source for interpretation of the
SRHA is later federal acts. In determining whether geothermal resources are a mineral, the Geothermal Steam Act
of 1970"1 may have some bearing. And in the area of gravel,
the Surface Resources Act of 194752 and the Common
Varieties Act of 1955"3 may be of some importance.
Statutes must apply only prospectively. 4 Thus it would
be improper to use a later act to give a meaning to an act if
the two statutes are not in pari materia55 because that would
make the later act apply retrospectively. The United States
Supreme Court has noted the hazards of using the views of
a subsequent Congress as a basis for inferring the intent of
an earlier one. 6 Yet the Court also notes that they "should
not be rejected out of hand as a source that a court may
consider in the search for legislative intent.""7
51.

30 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1976). Section 1024 states that as to any land
subject to geothermal leasing, all laws which provide for disposal of land
subject to reservation of any mineral shall thereafter be deemed to embrace
geothermal steam and associated geothermal resources as a substance which
must be reserved.

52. 30 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1976). Section 601 states that the Secretary may
dispose of mineral materials

(including common varieties of gravel)

on

public land if disposal is not expressly authorized by law (including the
United States mining laws).
53.

30 U.S.C. § 611 (1976). Section 611 provides that no deposit of common

56.

Andrus v. Shell Oil Co.,

varieties of gravel and certain other materials shall be deemed a valuable
mineral deposit within the meaning of the mining laws of the United States.
54. Southwestern Coal and Improvement Co. v. McBride, 185 U.S. 499, 503
(1902).
55. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (a later act may be
regarded as a legislative interpretation of an earlier act if the two are in
pari materia). This rule makes more sense when the statutes were enacted
by the same legislature at the same time, which was not the case here.
U.S.

, 100 S.Ct. 1932, 1938 N. 8 (1980).

57. Id.
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In Union Oil, the court used the Geothermal Steam Act
of 1970 as an example that the term "mineral" could encompass geothermal resources. 8 Section 1020 of the Act
directs the Attorney General to initiate appropriate proceedings to quiet the title of the United States to geothermal
resources in lands the surface of which had passed from
federal ownership with a reservation of minerals. 9 The
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs "took no position"
on the question of whether the mineral reservation in SRHA
patents included geothermal resources.60
The court's reliance on the 1970 Act was improper.
Congress' use of the term "minerals" as including geothermal
steam should have no bearing on the use and meaning of the
term by a 1916 legislature. In view of the expansive definition
of minerals under the mining law due to increased value of
all sorts of material and to increasing energy needs and
shortages, "mineral" today has a far different general
meaning than it had in 1916.
In Western Nuclear, the court brushes over the Common
Varieties Act of 1955 by saying that reserved minerals are
not necessarily the same as locatable minerals,6 ' although
the court did not make that distinction in examining case
authorities. The court is correct, however, in stating that
the classification of gravel in the Common Varieties Act of
1955 should not affect the meaning of the term "minerals" in
the SRHA. The two Acts are not sufficiently in pari materia,
and the latter Act should not apply retrospectively to determine the application of the former Act.
Putting the retrospective aspect aside, however, the
SRHA, itself, has an interesting futuristic aspect. The Act
states that the "coal and other mineral deposits in such
lands shall be subject to disposal by the United States in
accordance with the provisions of the coal and mineral land
laws in force at the time of such disposal." 2 Mineral lands
58. United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., supra note 3, at 1274.
59. 30 U.S.C. § 1020 (1976).
60. H.R. REP. No. 91-1544, 91st Cong., 2nd Session, reprinted at 3 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5113. 5119 (1970).

61. Western Nuclear Inc. v. Andrus, supra note 4 at 660-661.
62. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976).
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were considered to be those lands more valuable for purposes
of the minerals than for agriculture."3 Or, if "mineral land
laws" means the mining laws, locatable minerals are defined
within the tests of marketability and the prudent man test.64
This suggests that in determining whether a substance has
been reserved to the United States and can be disposed of
by the United States, these tests should be applied. Also, if
the Common Varieties Act of 1955 takes certain common
varieties of gravel out from the coverage of the mining laws,
these substances may no longer be capable of disposal under
the present mineral land laws as required by the SRHA.
However, the techniques of determining congressional intent
and purpose are the subject of much manipulation, and it
should be easy to assume that Congress expected the definition of "mineral land laws" to expand to include all laws
governing disposal of substances owned by the United States.
In summary then, other acts defining or at least implying a definition of the term, mineral, will not be of much
help in interpreting the SRHA.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE THEORIES OF ANALYSIS

An analysis of Union Oil and Western Nuclear shows
four different theories which could be the basis for analysis
of the mineral reservation question. The first is the major
analysis in Union Oil, that is that it was the purpose of
Congress to reserve the fuel or energy resources to the
United States upon the grant of SRHA lands. The second
was the major theory in Western Nuclear. This theory
encompasses the idea that any substance is a mineral, if it
has value in and of itself, and if the substance is valuable
today, was within the definition of mineral in 1916 when
the SRHA was passed.
A third theory underlied both Union Oil and Western
Nuclear: the analysis that Congress intended to split the
subject land into a surface estate to be granted to the home63. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1902); H. P. Bennet,
Jr., 3 L.D. 116 (1884); W. H. Hooper, 1 L.D. 560 (1881).
64. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 56, at 1935, note 4.
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steader for raising livestock and settling on semi-arid land,
and into a subsurface estate which is retained by the federal
government.
The fourth theory was mentioned by the Union Oil
6
court 5 and involves Kuntz's manner of enjoyment test.
This theory is based on the general intent of the parties to an
instrument by considering the purpose of the grant in terms
of the manner of enjoyment intended in the ensuing interests.
Kuntz states that the "surface is burdened with the right of
access and the mineral estate is burdened with the right of
the surface owner to insist that the surface be left intact
and that it not be rendered valueless for the purposes for
which it is adapted .... 6 The owner of the mineral estate
would compensate the surface owner for the destruction of
the surface owner's enjoyment. 8
69
The courts, the Interior Board of Land Appeals, the
0 have all
district court in Union Oil, and commentators"
referred to the legislative history of the SRHA. They each
find in that history, support for their own particular view.
The result sought, the theory used, and the particular words
underlined dictate the intent and purpose of Congress found
in that history,

Congressional Purpose: Reservation of Fuel Resources
The primary reason for the result in Union Oil is the
court's recognition of the potential value of geothermal
resources as an energy source. 1 Congress recognized this
value in the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970. The court
admits that in 1916, Congress was not aware of geothermal
energy," and perhaps the court would also admit that in
1916, Congress did not contemplate the energy crisis six
decades in the future. The court finds the purpose to reserve
United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., supra note 3, at 1274-footnote 7.
Kuntz, supra note 5, at 112.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 115.
Western Nuclear, Inc., 35 IBLA 146.
Bjorge, The Development of Geothermal Resources and the 1970 Geothermal
Steam Act Law in Search of Definition, 46 CoLO. L. REv. 1 (1974).
States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., supra note 3, at 1272-1273.
71. United
1273.
72. Id. at
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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future fuel sources in statements and actions by Theodore
Roosevelt in 1907, and in an annual report by the Department
of Interior.73 It is likely that neither the President nor the
Department knew of geothermal resources and the future
energy crisis either.
What the court in Union Oil is actually doing is imposing
its own economic values and present knowledge of geothermal
resources upon a 1916 Congress. This is judicial legislation. 4
The purpose which the court in Union Oil found in the history
of the SRHA was invented to meet the fact situation before
it. Gold and silver are still minerals even though they are
not energy resources, and the fact that gravel is not a fuel
resource does not necessarily mean that it is not a mineral.
What the court has said is that under the SRHA, energy
is a mineral. 5 As Bjorge points out, geothermal resources
are not limited to superheated steam." A geothermal resource is the natural heat of the earth existing below the
surface in such a condition that it is economically feasible to
be developed for commercial purposes.7 To say that heat
is a mineral is to say-that sunlight is a mineral because it
too is capable of being reduced to usable energy. And if
energy sources are minerals then water falls are minerals.
Congress, in 1970, made the policy decision that geothermal resources are of sufficient importance that the
government should encourage their development on public
land. Perhaps Congress would also make the decision that
the federal government is more capable of seeing that the
resource is developed than are private landowners. But this
decision should be made by legislatures and not by courts.
73.

Id. at 1274-1275. The court also finds support for its theory in the legis.lative reports and floor debates. This history goes -more toward the theory
of segregation of surface and subsurface estates and will be considered
below. See text infra at note 79.
74. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 342, 343 (1971) (rules of statutory construction are not substitutes for congressional law making) ; See also:
Hamilton v. Smith, 285 Ala. 199, 86 So. 2d 283, 285 (1956) ; Dickerson,
supra note 17, at 230.

75. United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif. supra note 3, at 1279.
76. Bjorge,- aupra note 70, at 21,..

77. Id.
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Valuable Substances: The Hindsight Test
The difficulties inherent in defining minerals as substances which have presently obtained economic value have
already been discussed. A more feasible definition would
include the three criteria used in the mining law, but the
determination of value would be made at the time the patent
was granted.
Subsurface Estate versus Mineral Estate
The most important underlying theme in both Union
Oil and Western Nuclear is the theory that the surface
estate is segregated from the subsurface estate. And it is in
this area that legislative history has been referred to most.
A few of the statements which the courts, the Interior Board
of Land and Appeals, and commentators have relied on are set
forth below."8
In Skeen v. Lynch, the court found that the legislative
that it was the purpose of Congress to segrehistory
gate theshowed
surface estate from the mineral estate. 9 But the
courts in Union Oil and Western Nuclear have misinterpreted this to mean segregation of the surface estate from
the subsurface estate.
The difference is significant. If the subsurface estate
were reserved to the United States, everything, mineral,
plant, animal or energy, below a certain point would belong
to the United States. If the mineral estate were reserved to
the United States, all mineral substances, be they on the
78. "It appeared to your committee that many hundreds of thousands of acres
of the lands of the character designated under this bill contain coal and
other minerals, the surface of which is valuable for stock-raising purposes.
The purpose of section 11 (the reservation) is to limit the operation of this
bill strictly to the surface of the lands described and to reserve to the
United States the ownership and right to dispose of all minerals underlying
the surface thereof. ... ." H.R. REP. No. 35, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1916).
"The farmer-stockman is not seeking and does not desire the minerals, his
experience and efforts being in the line of stock raising and farming, which
operation can be carried on without being materially interfered with by the
and the prospect in for and removal of same from
reseryatJonId..of_minerals
at 5.
the land."
"Mr. Ferris: It would. We believe it would cover every kind of mineral. All
kinds of minerals are reserved;" 53 CoNG. REC. 1171 (1916).
79. Skeen v. Lynch, supra-nOte 33, at 1046.
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surface or below, would belong to the United States. To say
that the subsurface estate is reserved certainly helps determine the issue of whether geothermal resources were reserved
because, by their very nature, they are subsurface resources.
Coal, however may be at the surface of the land. Granite cliffs
and the accompanying fallen blocks are at the surface. Gravel
may be interspersed with the sand and soil which compose
the surface.
The quoted legislative history supports the theory that
only the mineral estate was reserved just as well as it
supports the theory that the subsurface estate was reserved.
But to find the former theory in this history does not help
a court in its interpretation. To say that the mineral estate
was reserved does not define mineral, it only gives rise to
the very question that was asked. It is understandable, but
not forgiveable, that a court wishing to hold that a particular
substance belonged to the government would grasp at whatever straw was available to support their decision.
It is at this point that the rule of interpretation of
federal grants should be mentioned. It is a well known rule
of construction that federal grants are construed favorably
to the government and that "nothing passes except what is
conveyed in clear language.""0 The courts in Union Oil and
Western Nuclear follow this rule almost to the point of
absurdity. Surely the rule should not be used to define terms.
The courts should not say that the word in all federal patents
simply meant what the federal government in each particular adversarial position says it means.
The United States Supreme Court has not applied this
rule in its "full vigor" to grants under the railroad acts.81
It is undoubtedly ... the well-settled rule of this
court that public grants are construed strictly
against the grantees, but they are not to be so construed as to defeat the intent of the legislature, or
to withhold what is given either expressly or by
necessary or fair implication. 2
80. United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra note 9.
81. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 1403, 1411 (1976).
82. Id. The Court was citing U.S. v. Denver and Rio Grande R. R. Co., 150
U.S. 1, 14 (1893).
-....
.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/2

16

Kepler: The Meaning of Minerals in the Stock-Raising Homestead Act Minera
COMMENTS
1981

This language would seem to apply in the case of defining
the SRHA reservation. In construing a statute, the meaning
must first be sought in the language in which the act is
framed. 3 The pertinent language is:
Any qualified person may make entry under the
homestead laws of lands so designated by the
Secretary . . . and secure title thereto by complicance with the terms of the homestead laws.... ."
All entries made and patents issued under the
provisions . . . of this title shall be subject to and
contain a reservation... of coal and other minerals
• . . together with the right to prospect for, mine
and remove the same.85
This language is clear. Even the court in Union Oil
admits that the patentee receives title to all rights in the
land not reserved. 8 The language is clear that what was
retained was minerals, not a subsurface estate, and everything else-be it plant, animal, energy or some unknown
quantity heretofore undiscoverable-was conveyed to qualified patentees.
The Manner of Enjoyment Test
The "manner of enjoyment" test arose in the context
of private grants, and the issue was whether oil and gas
had been granted or reserved when the term "minerals" was
used in the instrument's granting or reservation clause."T
Kuntz pointed out the inconsistent results when courts tried
to determine the intent of the parties. These inconsistencies
arose because the courts were looking for a specific intent
when the parties probably had nothing specific in mind on
the matter at all. 88 Kuntz proposed that the general intent
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1916).
43 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976).
United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., supra note 3, at 1279.
Kuntz, supra note 5.
Id. at 112. There is still a question whether theories dealing with private
deeds can be applied to federal grants. There would be no inconsistent
holdings in the area of federal grants because there is only one party's
intent to discover and that is the intent of Congress. Yet, it is also likely
that Congress did not specifically have geothermal steam or gravel in mind
when it enacted the SRHA.
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of the parties be sought by considering the manner of
enjoyment intended by the ensuing interests. The manner
of enjoyment of the mineral estate would be through extraction of valuable substances whether presently valuable or
valuable at some point in the future due to development of
the arts and sciences. The manner of enjoyment of the surface
would be through retention of such substances as are necessary for the use of the surface. The two estates would be
mutually servient and dominant. The surface estate would
be burdened with the right of access and the mineral estate
burdened with the right of the surface owner to insist that
the surface be left intact and not be rendered valueless for
the purposes for which it was adapted. 9 If extraction of a
"mineral" destroyed the use of the surface, the owner of
the surface would have the right to be compensated for the
value of the land.9
Union Oil uses this theory in partial support of its
conclusion.9 It is indeed an attractive theory for it would
answer the issues here under consideration. Both geothermal
steam and gravel would be minerals but any damage to the
enjoyment of the surface estate by reason of their extraction
would have to be paid by the mineral estate owner.
But under this theory, the definition of minerals has
no limit. Kuntz's phrase, substances presently valuable or
valuable at some point in the future, might include water,
trees, soil and wildlife. It would only seem natural to seek
a meaning within the limits of the term "mineral". Trees
could then be excluded because they are plants, and wildlife
could be excluded because they are animals. Water and soil
would not, however, be excluded, and geothermal energy and
sunlight remain in question. 2
The best answer is to turn back to the original rule
of construction and seek the intent of Congress first in the
89. Id. at 113.
90. Id. at 115-116.
91. United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif.. supra note 3, at 1274 footnote 7.
.

See also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.26 (1980).

92;. One might question whether energy comes within the meaning of "substances."-
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language of the statute. When Congress reserved the coal
and other minerals, it provided for a right of access to
prospect, mine and remove those minerals. It also limited
this right in that the mineral locator was not to injure,
damage or destroy permanent improvements and was to
compensate the patentee for all damages to crops." Under
a "manner of enjoyment" test, this implies that Congress
did not expect the extraction of minerals to interfere with
the enjoyment of the surface estate except when removal
might entail destruction of such things as fences, buildings,
or crops. This implies that Congress had not anticipated
strip or pit mining, removal of support or removal of the
soil, which might include gravel and sand.
It was not until 1949 that Congress recognized that
extraction of minerals might totally remove the surface.
It then provided for payment for damages to the value of
the land for grazing.94 Even this is not a complete adoption
of the manner of enjoyment test, for part of the enjoyment
of the surface would be to realize its value for its highest
and best use. If a nearby city expanded to the point that
the land became valuable for subdivision, the manner of
enjoyment would include the ability to subdivide and sell
the surface. If it was the intent of the Congress to limit the
use of stock-raising homestead lands to such stock-raising
even after the patent had been granted, it would have intended to limit the development and settlement of the West.
No court has yet limited a patentee under the SRHA to use
of his or her land solely for grazing. The patentee gets more
than a permit to graze stock upon the land.95 The statute
itself did not and does not now comport with a "manner of
enjoyment" test.
CONCLUSION

Four underlying theories of the courts' decisions in
Union Oil and Western Nuclear have been discussed. Each
theory has been found to be inapplicable or incorrect. The
93. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976).
94. 30 U.S.C. § 54 (1976).
95. United States v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., eupra note 3, at 1279.
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courts, in an attempt to impose their own economic values,
have strayed from their proper judicial role. It was Congress'
intent under the SRHA to patent land to stock-raising land
entrymen reserving to itself only the minerals. The definition
of minerals should be determined at the time the patent was
granted by applying the general rules of the definition of
minerals under the mining laws. The definition of minerals
should not include forms of energy such as geothermal
energy unless at the time of the patent that energy was
considered to be a mineral by the standard authorities, in
trade or commerce, or known to be of value in the mechanical
or scientific arts.
LORETTA B. KEPLER
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